

# **SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM**

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## INTRODUCTION

Today, the idea of “transformation” in the Department of Defense is the overarching framework under which all else is being constructed. Military journals and publications are filled with the principles and definitions of that ubiquitous term. The spread of the idea begins with the National Security Strategy and cascades through the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *Unified Command Plan* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*. During a recent field trip to Washington, D.C., by students from the Joint Forces Staff College, virtually every briefer spoke on transformation in one context or another, from those at the National Security Council and The Joint Staff, to the speakers at the U.S. Coast Guard.

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union began a process that led to the end of the Cold War. It was then that the idea of transformation of the military forces began to be discussed. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 accelerated the process until it became almost a single solution answer to the question of how the United States must reshape its military to fight the War on Terrorism. Transformation is not just about structure and doctrine but also about how to think and how the military will administer policy and programs during the present century.

One aspect of the change is the need to transform the existing security assistance programs, which are an anachronism from the Cold War, to more accurately reflect the realities of the multi-polar world of the present. Specifically, those programs should support countries that assist the United States in its war on terrorism. Countries that participate as coalition partners or provide basing and overflight rights must also be encouraged. Currently, the program allocates 77 percent of its resources to just two countries: Israel and Egypt. That proportion is a holdover from another

era and hinders achievement of the goals of the National Security Strategy and the War on Terrorism.

## **THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM**

Joint Publication 1-02 defines security assistance as follows:

a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 as amended or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.<sup>1</sup>

There are six major program components: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program, Direct Commercial Sales, International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).<sup>2</sup> For simplicity and clarity, consider just the FMF and IMET programs, the most controversial of the traditional grant and loan expenditures. Brief explanations for these two programs are taken from the 2002 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) handbook *The Management of Security Assistance*, and the Secretary of State *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations 2003* respectively:

FMF: “At present the program consists of Congressionally appropriated *grants and loans* which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales (DCS) channels. The FMFP is authorized under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of AECA, and originally served to provide credit (loans) as an effective means for easing the transition of foreign governments from grant aid (i.e., MAP<sup>1</sup> and IMET) to cash purchases. . . Congress provided \$3,650 million for the FY 2002 FMFP in the *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2002*. All FMFP monies were provided entirely as grants.”<sup>3</sup>

IMET: “a low cost, highly effective component of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to students from over 125 allied and friendly nations. In many countries, it is the only military engagement tool available. IMET advances U.S. interests by furthering regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations, which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries. . . . IMET objectives are achieved through a variety of military education and training activities conducted by the Department of Defense for foreign military and civilian officials. These include formal instruction that involves over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations for over 11,000 foreign students.”<sup>4</sup>

## THE POLITICS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY




Figure 1: This chart shows the history of the security assistance program with a gradual growth in the program except for four significant times: (1) mid-1960s as most Vietnam aid is moved out of the security assistance budget, (2) mid-1970s as Congress cuts aid to “prevent another Vietnam,” (3) 1980s and Reagan’s aggressive use of security assistance in his foreign policy, and (4) mid-1980s and impact of massive budget deficit-induced cuts in the security assistance program. (Graph derived from data in Clarke, Duncan L., Daniel B. O’Connor and Jason D. Ellis, *Send guns and money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Security assistance has its origins in the Lend-Lease program of World War II.

That program was designed to allow President Franklin D. Roosevelt to provide military

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<sup>1</sup> The term “MAP” stands for Military Assistance Program, a former grant aid program that the FMF ab-

equipment to countries that he felt were critical to the defense of the United States. The United States used its industrial might to give Great Britain and the Soviet Union as well as many other countries the wherewithal to defend themselves against Nazi Germany's aggression.

While the Lend-Lease program was instrumental in bringing about the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis powers, the postwar world was not what the Allies had hoped for. No gratifying results such as the Council of Vienna occurred with a finality that satisfied all. A frigid chill descended upon Europe as East and West clashed ideologically over Europe's future.

In response to communist threats to Greece and Turkey, President Truman declared what became the foundation of security assistance throughout the Cold War: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressure."<sup>5</sup> His statement became popularly known as the Truman Doctrine. Security assistance poured into Europe followed in 1948 by the economic aid of the Marshall Plan. Both elements formed the focus for the underlying U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War: containment.

By 1951, Europe's economies were showing signs of recovery and the massive aid package was being scaled back. While the lion's share of security assistance still went to Western Europe, attention was beginning to be placed in other regions. In an effort to contain the Soviet Union, the United States entered into a number of bilateral and multilateral collective security agreements. By January of 1953, President Truman had signed defense agreements with 41 nations. These agreements, in addition to the protection of the United States, brought with them high levels of security assistance.<sup>6</sup>

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sorbed in 1990.

The outbreak of the Korean War caused a significant shift in where security assistance resources were distributed. With Europe essentially on its feet and able to defend itself under the fledgling North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the focus of the United States shifted to the Third World, in particular Asia. President Eisenhower upped the ante with his doctrine, which reserved the right to employ force, if necessary, to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression.<sup>7</sup> However, to improve the affordability of the program, Eisenhower changed its emphasis. The principal responsibility for defending a nation would depend upon its own soldiers with U.S. security assistance financing the equipping and training. U.S. military power would be ready to assist the country in its defense, but it was ultimately up to the government of that country. It would be cheaper to maintain a foreign soldier than a deployed American soldier: the United States would see more bang for its buck.<sup>8</sup>

The administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson took a more aggressive approach to security assistance in order to prevent the fall of Third World countries to the “domino effect.” They saw the wars of national liberation as the means by which communism was being spread and firmly believed it must be contained. The United States would embark on a process of “nation building” by increasing economic aid to the developing countries and augmenting their internal security and counterinsurgency capabilities through security assistance.<sup>9</sup> The result was that from 1963 to 1975 Indochina dominated the security assistance program, with the primary recipients being South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos.<sup>10</sup> While Kennedy and Johnson raised the bar, they did little more than apply the basics of the Eisenhower Doctrine in involving the United States in Vietnam.

President Richard Nixon's era saw significant changes in overall U.S. foreign policy, including détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with Red China and a Europe increasingly independent in its international economic and East-West dealings.<sup>11</sup> These changes dominated not only his administration but also that of President Ford due to the continued presence of Henry Kissinger. The experience of Vietnam further affected foreign policy as it created a perceived national desire not to get involved directly in any more wars of national liberation. Nixon and Kissinger understood that reluctance and, after successfully extracting the United States from the Vietnamese conflict, realigned the country with the Eisenhower Doctrine, now restated as the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon pledged that the United States would continue to honor its commitments, furnish economic and military aid to friends and allies, and provide a nuclear shield; however, primary responsibility for providing the manpower for self-defense would be left to the allies themselves.<sup>12</sup> The United States would not get involved in another Vietnam. Central to that doctrine was the provision of "substantial assistance" to friends and allies.<sup>13</sup>

Until the fall of Saigon in 1975, Indochina dominated the security assistance budget. With the fall of Vietnam and the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, significant changes occurred in the amount and distribution of the aid. The security assistance budget tripled with the Middle East taking center stage, eclipsing all other regions as Indochina had done for the past decade. Secretary of State Kissinger justified the shift, which occurred simultaneously with his famous Shuttle Diplomacy in an effort to solve Middle East issues, as necessary "to further the momentum [of] the peace process."<sup>14</sup> By the mid-1970s, 70 percent of the security assistance budget was going to the Middle East, predominantly to Israel and Egypt, but Jordan and Syria were also notable recipients.<sup>15</sup>



The presidency of Jimmy Carter brought a new twist to security assistance. President Carter tried to use security assistance as a tool in his efforts to improve human rights and dignity in the Third World. In the past, such factors were overlooked in U.S. dealings with less than savory governments as long as they were with America in its struggle with the Soviet Union. Carter believed that “moral principles were the best foundation” for American foreign policy and that idealism was a practical and realistic approach to American foreign affairs.<sup>16</sup> He intended to use the conventional arms transfer element of security assistance as an “exceptional” element, not the mainstay as had been the previous policy. Presidential Directive 13, which laid out a restrictive arms transfer policy, was hardest felt by the Third World as major U.S. allies and alliances such as NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand were specifically exempted. Israel also managed to find receptive members of Congress to exempt it from the directive’s provisions.<sup>17</sup>

Unfortunately for President Carter, the world situation did not support his new idealistic foreign policy. The Soviet Union took advantage of the perceived U.S. weakness and unwillingness to get involved in the Third World and became much more aggressive and assertive in its support for wars of national liberation. In addition, President Carter found that security assistance was a necessary element in the successful completion of his shining moment: the Camp David Accords that brought peace between Egypt and Israel in 1978. As a result of these influences, by the end of President Carter’s term American arms transfers actually increased in volume significantly.

In spite of President Carter’s idealism, the end of the 1970s found the allocation of security assistance essentially unchanged from that of Presidents Ford and Nixon and

would remain so until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Aid to East Asia, once the principal recipient, had dropped precipitously. European aid was focused on the base-rights countries of Greece, Turkey, Spain and Portugal. Huge earmarks of aid for Egypt and Israel, which seemed extraordinary during the Ford administration, were now commonplace. The most significant impact of Carter's human rights emphasis was manifested by a sharp decline in security assistance to Latin American countries as assistance was cut off from countries with repressive regimes or questionable human rights records.<sup>18</sup>

The election of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency in 1980 brought an outwardly more aggressive foreign policy, particularly towards the Soviet Union and its satellites. Reagan rescinded Carter's Presidential Directive 13 and openly advocated assisting a wide variety of ideologically diverse groups that were resisting regimes backed by Moscow. Reagan's policy was predicated on the notion that the United States could not defend the free world's interests alone but must be prepared to strengthen the military capabilities of friends and allies by the transfer of conventional arms and other forms of security assistance.<sup>19</sup> Contrary to the Carter policy of "exception," security assistance was now to be an indispensable element of American foreign policy.<sup>20</sup>

In spite of the change of emphasis and bravado of the Reagan security assistance policy, the distribution of the aid did not change substantially. The bulk of it continued to flow to the Middle East (i.e., Israel and Egypt) and the base-rights countries. The changes in security assistance came in other regions, as Reagan sent aid to what were termed "front line states" such as South Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Sudan.<sup>21</sup> These countries bordered hostile states backed by the Soviet Union and its allies. The most sig-

nificant reversal in policy occurred in Central America, where Carter had significantly cut aid due to human rights abuses by the questionable regimes. Reagan saw the various quasi-democratic regimes or movements as contributing to the struggle with the Soviet Union, in particular, El Salvador's struggle with insurgency and countering the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.<sup>22</sup> The efforts of the Reagan administration in his second term were muted, however, by concern over rising federal budget deficits as security assistance was subject to substantial cuts in the mid-1980s that were borne predominantly by the "front line states."

President Reagan turned the reins over to his protégé, George H. W. Bush, in 1988. President Bush's term saw the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union as well as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The struggle with the Soviet Union had been the philosophical underpinning of the security assistance programs of every presidency since Harry S. Truman in 1947. While in practice the vast majority of the assistance went to the Middle East in support of the peace process, the remaining aid was used to support the Cold War. With the collapse of the USSR, that rationale was lost, yet no significant change in policy was evident. The Bush administration continued the Reagan programs with the same justifications:<sup>23</sup>

- Promoting peace in the Middle East
- Maintaining base access
- Supporting allies against internal subversion
- Supporting cooperative relationships

President William J. Clinton took office in 1992 with a more economically oriented agenda. His security assistance program was oriented to assist the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union. Even that laudatory initiative had a cost; the

rest of the security assistance program (except for that given to Israel and Egypt) was cut to fund the \$2.5-billion program.<sup>24</sup>

Clinton, like his Cold War predecessors, discovered that foreign aid (and security assistance in particular) was an important part of foreign policy in an international system where the United States still played a pivotal role. The Clinton policy remained largely in line with the large open-ended Reagan-Bush approach in that arms transfers were justified and encouraged on a wide variety of often vague and contradictory grounds.<sup>25</sup>

It is easy to surmise that the security assistance policy of the George W. Bush presidency would have followed the precedents set by his predecessors had it not been for the events of 11 September 2001. The events of that day dramatically changed and defined Bush's presidency. His response, "If you're not with us, you're against us," has been clear and concise. When the United States began to develop its international coalition against terrorism, President Bush looked for countries that were willing and able to take part in the military, political, economic, and diplomatic efforts deemed necessary to stamp out the terrorists and their networks. The war on terrorism reordered the world scattered when the Cold War ended. With the United States looking for partners, countries have been willing to go along—for a price. An administration official said potential allies "are certainly looking to see what the benefits of a relationship with the United States are going to be. As we approached countries in Central Asia, where we had no national security relationship before the war [on terrorism], it was one of the things that we did to make sure that we had a security relationship that wasn't just one-way."<sup>26</sup> In an effort to win new friends, reward old ones and prepare others to fight a war on terrorism,

the United States loosened export restrictions on arms sales, while boosting military aid to many countries and increasing financing for their purchase of U.S. weapons.

The United States is more willing than ever to sell or give away weapons to countries that have pledged assistance in the war on terrorism, regardless of past behavior. In some cases, these recipients of security assistance are weak or failing states that in the past have been criticized for human rights violations, lack of democracy, and support of terrorism. This occurs in spite of a standing tenet of U.S. policy that weapon exports should not undermine long-term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms buildups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses.<sup>27</sup> Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, foreign security assistance—mostly grants to buy U.S. weaponry—has increased \$500 million, to more than \$4 billion for fiscal 2003.<sup>28</sup> In the Persian Gulf region alone over the past two years, the United States has sold, lent, or given away an estimated \$7.5 billion worth of weaponry, other military equipment, and training assistance.<sup>29</sup> Recipients have included such vital U.S. allies as Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. President Bush rewarded Pakistan with a \$1 billion aid package and the likelihood that assorted sanctions will be lifted.<sup>30</sup> In return, many of the same countries provided vital support, such as airfields, during the U.S. war against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan and against Iraq. Administration officials say the aid has been one of the most effective means of finding and sustaining foreign support for the war on terrorism: "we provided money so they could . . . participate in doing what we were asking them to do," said an

official involved in the program. "Security assistance . . . is a tool of U.S. national security and foreign policy."<sup>31</sup>




Figure 2. (Data from Department of State, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, dated 13 February 2003, <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/> )

The approach using security assistance as such a tool is evident in the Fiscal Year 2004 Department of State Military Assistance Budget. While the underlying drive for security assistance has changed since the Cold War, the budget since the mid-1970s has been dominated by “grants” to Israel (\$2.1 billion) and Egypt (\$1.3 billion), which account for 77 percent of the program (see Figure 2). The limited portion of the budget remaining has been reoriented to support the war on terror. Four countries critical to the war received 12 percent of the budget with Jordan getting 5 percent, Afghanistan 3 percent, and Colombia and Pakistan 2 percent each. Most of the rest has gone to Europe and Eurasia and is aimed at continuing the integration of newly accepted NATO members into the Alliance and assisting the Partnership for Peace efforts in the Balkans, the Cau-

casus, and the Central Asian states, all of whom remain vital participants in the war on terrorism. Grants in East Asia, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere go dominantly to single countries, the Philippines, then Afghanistan and Colombia respectively. Finally, Pakistan (in the South Asia region) received a substantial grant to fund its continued participation in and support of U.S. operations against global terrorism.

### **THE MECHANICS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE**

The security assistance program is developed through a federal interagency process. Agencies with an interest vary from the obvious State and Defense Departments to the seemingly uninterested Departments of Labor and Commerce; however, the budget is developed through the interaction of only the Departments of State and Defense. The process begins with the President, who determines policy, and ultimately ends with the host nation and the U.S. country team who deliver the aid. Under existing FAA and AECA legislation, the President, via the Secretary of State, submits his recommendations to Congress via the Foreign Operations Budget for its review, approval, and enactment through authorization and appropriation legislation.<sup>32</sup> Legislation is developed based on priorities derived through both a “bottom-up” and “top-down” process based on inputs from State, Secretary of Defense, ambassadors, regional combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the various undersecretaries of State and Defense, as well as the National Security Adviser and the Office of Management and Budget. The President’s broad guidance is given to these key players via the National Security Strategy, which is given greater granularity through the National Military Strategy as published by the CJCS. Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense releases his cooperation guidance to the regional combatant commanders. That document contains:

instruction on implementing our new defense strategy through regional partnerships . . . As the U.S. military transforms, it is in our interest to make arrangements for international military cooperation to ensure that rapidly transforming U.S. capabilities can be applied effectively with allied and coalition capabilities. U.S. transformation objectives should thus be used to shape and complement foreign military developments and priorities of likely partners, both in bilateral and multilateral contexts.”<sup>33</sup>

Two other documents, the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, are also sent to the regional combatant commanders by the Defense Department to aid them in defining their security assistance roles and missions.<sup>34</sup>

The regional combatant commanders in conjunction with the ambassadors in their region develop their Theater Security Cooperation Concept focused on the Tier I target countries that the Secretaries of both State and Defense have prioritized within the region. Those are the main effort nations that form the nucleus of the security assistance program to gain access for the conduct of operational preparation of the battlefield: to meet and develop contacts within both the host-nation military and political institutions. Second are the Tier II target countries that will be needed for access to Intermediate Staging Bases and overflight rights. Finally, there will be the Tier III and less important countries that will receive a smaller share of security assistance dollars, but are not to be ignored, as they could prove important to future U.S. interests.

The plan is sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense via the ambassadors and regional combatant commanders’ political advisers, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Joint Staff for review. Once differences are resolved, the Foreign Operations Budget is sent to Congress for enactment.

A seemingly simple process, the development of the security assistance program and its associated budget is fraught with potential landmines. It is an interagency process, which includes interaction with Congress and outside influences.



## **BEHIND THE SCENES WITH SECURITY ASSISTANCE**

Like all aspects of American government, the security assistance program is defined by a community of influences, not just the President and his administration. The influences on the development of the security assistance can be grouped as follows: (1) the President and his administration, including the Departments of State and Defense, (2) foreign countries and special interest groups, and (3) the Congress.

The President and the executive branch over the years have come to see the security assistance program as a vital element of their foreign policy programs, so it has widespread support in the executive branch. The Departments of Defense and State, being the biggest supporters, see it as a means to further regional stability through military-to-military relations, which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries as well as improving their defense ability. It is a means, in Eisenhower's words, of getting "more bang for the buck." By fostering good relations with critical countries, the United States can gain access and influence in a region. The Departments of Labor, Commerce, and Treasury look to the impact on the U.S. economy. Most FMF aid is usually in the form of grants to be used to purchase American products, be they weapons, munitions, or other goods. All help with creating jobs, wealth, and the international trade balance.

The foreign countries and special interest groups usually lobby the Congress to influence the security assistance budget in a manner that will benefit them. Israel is the most effective of such organizations, particularly when coupled with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Established in 1954, AIPAC has no rival in influencing security assistance allocation. Its influence is widespread and legendary. At a

1995 annual AIPAC meeting in Washington, D.C., 100 representatives and 54 senators attended with President Clinton giving the keynote address.<sup>35</sup> Shrewd lobbyists, AIPAC members generally foster the entire security assistance program, but not out of altruism. By doing so, AIPAC strives to hide within the budget the size of Israel's huge annual aid (which it as well as many Israel supporters has come to regard as an entitlement).

Interest groups also represent business and labor. One of that type is ALESA: American League for Exports and Security Assistance, Inc. A seemingly unlikely grouping of corporations and trade unions, ALESA membership benefits from the sales of military equipment. The interest is obviously economic: the more aid and grants, the more sales and profits for the corporations, and the unions get job stability. While there are internal conflicts within the group, in general all benefit from supporting security assistance.

But it is Congress that most profoundly influences the security assistance budget. The foreign assistance budget, submitted annually to the Congress, is the most direct manner for Congress to influence the foreign policy of the United States. The debate over the funding of security assistance is cover for the more fundamental issue: the Constitutional role of the Congress in the formulation of foreign policy. To the executive branch, security assistance is a useful, low-cost tool for implementing policy (as Eisenhower envisioned), while Congress sees it as not only a means to influence that policy but also a tangible expression of its own "coequal status with the executive branch in the realm of foreign policy."<sup>36</sup>

Security assistance also allows Congress to satisfy various special interest groups' desires. It is an inexpensive way of placating ethnic, religious, or cultural groups of vot-

ers in the home district. It is also a program that most Americans are not even aware exists and they do not concern themselves with it, which means Congressmen can safely advocate its reductions as a cost savings to the government while knowing that no one will care sufficiently to follow up on whether they actually vote for its demise.

Finally, Congress has the ultimate power in its control over the purse strings of the government. Perhaps it is in that way, not the debate over where and why, that Congress has the greatest potential for impact. Congress can and does influence much of the budget by imposing earmarks and conditions. By earmarking, Congress ensures that favored nations receive a particular portion of the budget that the President and State Department cannot reallocate. Congress can also put conditions on the use of the security assistance with regard to a particular country. The best example was the condition placed on security assistance given to El Salvador in the 1980s that the total U.S. military group in-country could not exceed 55 people. Through such actions, Congress can and does influence and constrain the President's foreign programs.

### **SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE**

The tragic events of 11 September 2001 exposed America to the horrors of terrorism. The vastness of its two oceans could no longer defend it from the playbook of terrorist regimes. Al Qaida remains an active transnational terrorist network that must be eradicated. The recent bombings of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia attest to Al Qaida's continual destructive nature. Despite the fact that the United States is the sole remaining superpower, it must continue to enlist the help of its allies and others to defeat this new wave of terrorism.

The use of security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy to combat terrorism is crucial. However, the United States cannot afford to continue its current distribution of security assistance dollars and expect to execute a successful campaign against terrorism. The distribution must be based on the threats to the national interests. Since the War on Terrorism is the nation's highest priority, the government must now determine which countries will benefit most from its security assistance dollars.

In March 2003, the Bush Administration submitted a supplemental budget request to Congress proposing a 50 percent jump in Foreign Military Financing funds in fiscal year 2003. The purpose of the increase is to bolster international border security and antiterrorism programs.<sup>37</sup> In an interview with Stephen Trimble from *Aerospace Daily*, Lieutenant General Tome Walters, head of the U.S. Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA), states, "The bulk of the proposed funding, totaling nearly \$2.06 billion, already is earmarked for programs that could contribute to the war on terrorism. A key focus of the funding would improve border security for several front-line states, such as Pakistan and Jordan."<sup>38</sup> The first two columns of the table below depict the proposed distribution of the excess FMF funds. The third column identifies the total military expenditures by country. The last column represents the military expenditures as a percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).

<b>Country</b>	<b>Amount 2003</b>	<b>Military Expenditures</b>	<b>Percent of GDP</b>
Israel	\$1 billion	\$8.866 billion ('01)	8%
Jordan	\$406 million	\$757.5 million ('01)	8.6%
Oman	\$61.5 million	\$2.424 billion ('01)	12.2%
Bahrain	\$90 million	\$526.2 million ('01)	6.7%
Djibouti	\$5 million	\$26.5 million ('01)	4.4%
Poland	\$15 million	\$3.5 billion ('02)	1.71%
Hungary	\$15 million	\$1.08 billion ('02)	1.75%
Czech Republic	\$15 million	\$1.190 billion ('01)	2.1%
Estonia	\$2.5 million	\$155 million ('02)	2%
Latvia	\$2.5 million	\$87 million ('01)	1.2%
Slovakia	\$6 million	\$406 million ('02)	1.89%
Romania	\$15 million	\$985 million ('02)	2.47%
Slovenia	\$5 million	\$370 million ('00)	1.7%
Lithuania	\$3.5 million	\$230.8 million ('01)	1.9%
Bulgaria	\$5 million	\$356 million ('01)	2.7%
Philippines	\$30 million	\$995 million ('98)	1.5%
Afghanistan	\$170 million	Not available	NA
Pakistan	\$175 million	\$2.545 billion ('01)	4.6%
Colombia	\$37.1 million	\$3.3 billion ('01)	3.4%

Table 1: Foreign Military Financing Supplemental Request. The military expenditure and GDP information was derived from the Central Intelligence Agency's *The World Factbook 2002*. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html><sup>39</sup>

One could argue that the requested supplemental funding could be better distributed among these and other nations to produce a more effective campaign against the war on terrorism. The global magnitude of the terrorism threat requires a security assistance strategy of global scope whose charter is to reduce or eliminate breeding grounds for terrorist camps that thrive on countries struggling to survive. However, as depicted by the chart, many of the countries spend a very small percentage of their GDP on military capabilities, thereby making it impossible to successfully defeat the growing number of terrorists finding refuge in their countries. A joint campaign orchestrated by the United States and the coalition of the willing against terrorism will prove vital in the eradication

of that evil. Furnishing additional security assistance to countries most vulnerable to terrorist exploitation is one step in the right direction.

In testimony before Congress on February 5, 2003, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is developing a concept of operations to disrupt terrorist operations in and around Yemen. “Central to this plan, USCENTCOM proposed to strengthen Yemeni Special Forces capability for counter-terrorism operations and expand intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations.”<sup>40</sup> Unfortunately, Yemen is not slated to receive any of the \$2.06 billion supplemental increase.

To combat the ever-increasing terrorist threat in Africa, General Myers also states that USCENTCOM has established a Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) as part of its Theater Counterterrorism Campaign.<sup>41</sup> Although Djibouti is scheduled to receive \$5 million of the supplemental funds, other countries such as South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria are absent from the supplemental funding chart. However, Africa remains a hot spot for terrorist activities. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania remind the nation daily of its vulnerabilities in that region. Expanding U.S. security assistance to those and other terrorism-susceptible countries will assist in promoting regional stability and aid in the global fight against terrorism.

### **THE IMPACT OF NOT USING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS**

Despite the long-term mutual benefits of the security assistance programs, many advocates argue that security assistance is not an effective program, as it encourages questionable regimes and contributes to regional instability. Some have even argued for the total elimination of the security assistance programs. Despite the fact that only a

small percentage of the government's budget is spent on those programs, some critics assert that the expense is not justified.

In his article "The Sins of the Security Assistance Programs," David Isenberg, research analyst at the Center for Defense Information, recommends cancellation of the FMF and IMET programs. He states:

The United States should cancel the FMF program. It is the biggest of the security assistance programs, and it militarizes American foreign policy by locking the United States into de facto alliances with a motley assortment of regimes. . . . The IMET program should be canceled. Soldiers trained under the IMET do not go home determined to respect the principle of military subordination to civilian political authority. Instead, they frequently stage coups or wield enormous power behind the scenes, turning civilian political authorities into mere figureheads.<sup>42</sup>

Isenberg's article was written before 11 September 2001, and some commentary on it has been written since that tragic event. Tamar Gabelnick, director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists, writes in her article "Security Assistance After September 11," "Antiterrorism has replaced anticommunism as the 21<sup>st</sup> century's all-purpose rationale for providing U.S. military aid, weapons, and training to foreign militaries."<sup>43</sup> She continues, "Wrapping new security assistance programs in a counterterrorism cloak allows the administration to provide support for repressive regimes and aid to states verging on, or currently involved in, armed conflict."<sup>44</sup>

Gabelnick is not alone in her argument. For example, Henry Kelly, president of the Federation of American Scientists, expressed similar sentiment in his letter to several Congressmen. He states:

Providing foreign states more weapons will not make it easier for them to assist U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. Increasing their access to U.S. arms does, however, increase the likelihood that weapons will leak through corrupt channels or theft into the hands of terrorists. . . . U.S. arms could also

help authoritarian governments build national military forces more likely to be used for suppressing legitimate dissent than defending against external threats and terrorism. History has shown that sending weapons and military aid to regimes that do not share U.S. interests can end up undermining U.S. security.<sup>45</sup>

Another group voicing concerns over the U.S. security assistance policy is the Human Rights Watch (HRW) organization. In a report entitled “Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance After September 11,” HRW writes “Congress and the Bush administration have degraded human rights policy by lifting sanctions on arms transfers to countries with poor human rights records.”<sup>46</sup> Although the United States has relied heavily on its foreign security assistance programs to fight the war on terrorism, HRW “opposes military assistance to governments that have engaged in a pattern of gross violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.”<sup>47</sup> Several countries that have joined the United States in the war on terrorism are among those identified by HRW as being gross violators of human rights.

Despite the preceding logical arguments, the security assistance programs have proven effective as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Cancellation of either of these programs (i.e., FMF and IMET) would not support the tenets of the President’s National Security Strategy.

The key to preserving U.S. national security is the strategic and effective use of security assistance programs. The war on terrorism demands that the United States invoke all of the tools in its kit to destroy that menace to civilized society. The United States cannot fight the evil alone. There must be a coalition of nations engaged in winning this war. The United States must continue to lead the way and assist those nations unable to secure their borders from infiltration of terrorist cells. By providing military



equipment and training, the United States assures its allies and friends that the nation is committed to winning this war.

Security assistance programs such as FMF and IMET provide means for the United States to continue to exert its leadership and influence around the world. The programs also give the United States the leverage to gain aerial and sea access into various countries. For example, the benefits of U.S. security assistance efforts in Uzbekistan paid off during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Uzbekistan permitted the United States military to use critical en route landing bases needed to continue prosecution of the war.

According to the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 is another example of the value of security assistance programs. These programs provided for equipment and procedural capabilities among many of the coalition forces through past sales of U.S. equipment and technical and professional training in U.S. military classrooms. “The requirement for international military students to know English during their U.S. training contributed significantly to improved communications during the war.”<sup>48</sup>

Without security assistance programs, the United States would not have the leverage necessary to influence world opinion. Those programs enable the United States to stay engaged in various regions of the world. Through training and equipping, the United States exerts influence. Teaching the tactics, techniques, and procedures also produces mutual benefits through improved interoperability. Accomplishment of such activities assures allies and friends that the United States is willing to commit its resources to assist them in the professionalization of their militaries.

## SUMMARY

The United States Security Assistance program requires a significant transformation to support the National Security Strategy and the war on terrorism. Weaknesses are seen by reviewing the mechanism by which the security assistance program is developed and how the security assistance policy has changed over the years. At the higher level of policy, security assistance policy is dynamic, changing to meet the fluid security world environment. In addition, the mechanism that supports and executes that policy is, at least within the executive branch, a viable and functioning interagency process that not only supports the President's National Security Strategy but also incorporates the views of the ambassadors and the regional combatant commanders.

While security assistance is evolving, the program's ability to support the President and the war on terrorism is hamstrung by special interest groups and Congress. The influence of such groups, amplified by the Congressional desire to influence foreign policy, prevents the executive branch from fully exercising the potential of the security assistance program. One could argue that this tension between the branches of government is nothing more than the day-to-day application of the checks and balances built into the American way of government by the founders in 1787. Congress will argue that they are doing nothing more than representing the wishes of the people, their constituency. The administration, on the other hand, argues that foreign policy is the domain of the President and that Congress's meddling does nothing more than hamstringing his ability to effect a policy beneficial to the United States, not a minority segment of the populace. The core issue boils down to that basic element of Washington life—power. Sadly, security assistance has become Congress's target, as most Americans are unaware of the extent or im-

part of the program, and it is an area where a congressman can advocate either cost savings without advocating a variety of constituents or a program change or conditions in order to placate a particular voting bloc.

Were this power struggle resolved, reducing the security assistance provided to Israel and Egypt would release funds that could have a significant impact in numerous Third World countries. The countries, or more correctly the regions, that are of concern to the United States in pursuit of its strategic priority—combating terrorism—generally fall outside most of Congress’s interests. These regions are those with new, fledgling, and struggling democracies and include principally Africa and South Asia. A review of news stories over the past few years shows the need for continued and increased U.S. aid to these regions: the bombings of the American embassies in Africa, the bombing of the nightclub in Bali, the increased antiterrorist activities in the Philippines and Singapore. Democracy has taken root in key African nations of Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa, and, while not perfect as in the recent questionable election in Nigeria, is struggling along. Some of the governments in those regions have a highly questionable human rights record that has been a Congressional lightning rod in the past. Continued U.S. involvement with those countries is essential, as change is easier from within than from the outside. Greater assistance to countries in those regions would strengthen their governments and encourage their support for American efforts in the regions and globally. The aid must not be given blindly without regard for its use, but serve as the basis for greater American involvement with the governments, militaries, and peoples. Unfortunately, political pressures and influences in the current security assistance environment prevent the needed changes from being made, and the administration is forced into work-

arounds (such as the current \$2.06 billion supplemental budget request before Congress) to support the War on Terrorism. Security assistance is a viable and evolving program, but a reduction in the influence of the Israeli special interest groups is essential to complete this transformation.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> U.S. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). *The Management of Security Assistance*. 22nd ed. U.S. Department of Defense, 2002, p. 57.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 58.
- <sup>4</sup> Foreign Operations, Congressional Budget Justification, The Secretary of State, Fiscal Year 2003, p. 131.
- <sup>5</sup> Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, *Send Guns and Money: security assistance and U.S. foreign policy*, (Praeger Publishers, CT) 1997, p. 34.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 36.
- <sup>7</sup> Ronald T. Covais, LTC, "The Role of Security Assistance in National Security Strategy," (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA), 1987, p. 5.
- <sup>8</sup> Clarke, p. 38.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 46.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 48.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 53.
- <sup>12</sup> Covais. p. 6.
- <sup>13</sup> Clarke, p. 53.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 55.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 55.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 65.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 66.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 67.
- <sup>19</sup> Covais, p. 8.
- <sup>20</sup> Clarke, p. 72.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 73.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 73.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 82.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 88.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 89.
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- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Michael Jordan, "America's 'With or Against Us' War Irks Many U.N. Nations," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 November 2001
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- <sup>32</sup> DISAM.
- <sup>33</sup> "Security Cooperation Guidance for FY 2004," The Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 24 April 2003, p. 1.
- <sup>34</sup> Jane Hammond, personal interview, 15 May 2003.
- <sup>35</sup> Clarke, p. 138
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 101.
- <sup>37</sup> Stephen Trimble, "Border Security is Focus of Proposed \$2 Billion FMF Hike." *Aerospace Daily*, March 2003. On-line. Internet, 14 May 2003. Available from: [http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?\\_m=3f7a8c63547931ccd37ffaald79e9812](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=3f7a8c63547931ccd37ffaald79e9812)
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> *The World Factbook 2002*. On-line. Internet, December 2002. Available from: CIA Home Page, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.
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<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

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<sup>48</sup> U.S. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. *The Management of Security Assistance*. 22nd ed. U.S. Department of Defense, 2002.

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